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DOCTORS & SOCIETY
Doctors as fiduciaries: a legal construct of the patient-
physician relationship
Fidelity is the most fundamental ethical principle
regulating the medical profession, and it requires
medical professionals (MPs) to put their patients’
interests ahead of all others, including their own. The
MPs who contracted and/or died of severe acute
respiratory syndrome in the 2003 epidemic clearly
illustrated both the glory and cost of living with this
principle.1 Yet, if we look at the four classic models of
the patient-physician relationship (PPR): ‘contractual’,
‘paternalistic’, ‘collegial’, and ‘mentoring’,2 none
appears to mandate this level of fidelity from the
MP, legally or ethically, because these models of
the PPR have been narrowly construed to provide a
normative evaluation of patient autonomy rather than
professionalism and professional obligations. This
may be why medical fidelity has not been given its
proper place in modern bioethics. We need a PPR
model that is more commensurate with this core value
of the medical profession; the legal fiduciary model
may be best suited the task.
The fiduciary concept is not new to the medical
community; the PPR has been recognised as a
fiduciary relationship (FR) in the West by the
American College of Legal Medicine.3 Beauchamp
and Childress4 unequivocally state that “The patient-
physician relationship is a fiduciary relationship—that
is, founded on trust or confidence; and the physician
is therefore necessarily a trustee for the patient’s
medical welfare.” Without explicitly mentioning the
term ‘fiduciary’, the Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs of the American Medical Association has
stated: “The relationship between patient and physi-
cian is based on trust and gives rise to physicians’
ethical obligations to place patients’ welfare above
their own self-interest…”.5
The characteristic attributes of a fiduciary
relationship
Explicitly for the exclusive benefit of one party
Most relationships exist for the mutual benefit of all
parties, but an FR is explicitly established for the
benefit of one party. In the paradigmatic FR of
trustee-beneficiary, “the purpose of the relationship and
the role and reason of one party in it [is] to promote
the interest of the other”.6 As fiduciaries, trustees have
a legal duty to act altruistically by relinquishing their
own self-interests and administering the trust solely
on behalf of and in the interests of the beneficiaries.
Likewise, a PPR exists for the benefit of the patient,
and the functions performed by MPs are solely for the
benefit of the patient, despite MPs being monetarily
compensated for their services.
Delegated discretionary power
In an FR, the beneficiary delegates discretionary
powers to the fiduciary, eg principal-agent, who is
then held to strict fiduciary standards of conduct. In
the PPR, MPs are delegated discretionary power in
matters of health care (eg prescribing medicine) by
the community and for the benefit of the community,
as well as directly from individual patients they attend
to. In the course of treating patients, MPs often
expose patients’ bodies and solicit very personal
information that would otherwise be strictly private.
Patients forego privacy in deference to the MP’s
medical knowledge in order to facilitate their health
care. Pellegrino7 aptly remarks that “the knowledge
the physician offers is not proprietary; … [it] is not
individually owned and ought not be used primarily
for personal gain, prestige, or power. Rather, the
profession holds this knowledge in trust for the good
of the sick.”
Inequality and susceptibility to abuse
The acquisition of powers by one party implies an
inequality of influence, knowledge, and bargaining
ability in an FR, and this provides the fiduciary “a
special opportunity to exercise the power or discretion
to the detriment of that other person…” (Mason J in
Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical
Corporation, 1984). Inherent in the FR is the fact
that the fiduciary is susceptible to misusing or abusing
the entrusted power and position to promote his
own interests or to undermine the beneficiary’s
interests or both. Similarly, in a PPR, MPs possess
privileged information and technical superiority that
endow them with significant power over patients, and
render the MP susceptible to abusing that power and
harming patients. Fiduciary safeguards are necessary
to prevent such abuses.
Trust, vulnerability, and expectation
In an FR, one party’s position of power implies that
the other party must repose trust and confidence: the
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Latin root of ‘fiduciary’ means ‘to trust’. In a PPR,
because of the predicament of illness and the MP’s
monopoly of knowledge, patients must necessarily
repose trust and confidence in MPs. The Canadian
Supreme Court holds that trust and loyalty are the
real basis for treating the PPR as an FR (McInerney v
MacDonald, 1992), and imposes fiduciary obligations
on MPs to act in their patients’ best interests.
One party’s ascendancy also entails the other
party’s dependence on and vulnerability to the former’s
exploitation and manipulation. Some legal experts
consider dependence and vulnerability more impor-
tant attributes than trust and loyalty in an FR. Patients
in a PPR have transferred the necessary power to
the MPs, leaving them vulnerable and at the MPs’
mercy. Furthermore, a PPR is usually established at
a time when patients are most helpless and least
capable of protecting themselves, and are therefore
entirely dependent on MPs. Some judges have
compared the patient’s vulnerability in a PPR to that
between ‘a parent and his child’ or a ‘guardian and his
ward’ and justified the law’s use of fiduciary stand-
ards to regulate MPs for patients’ protection.
Fiduciary obligation of fidelity as morality
and law
Once an FR is established, fiduciary obligations are
due, and fidelity or loyalty is universally considered
the most fundamental obligation: “the beneficiary is
entitled to the uncompromised loyalty of and honest
services provided by its fiduciaries, and… any act
compromising that loyalty is, in and of itself, a
harm to the principal.”8 In a PPR, MPs are bound by a
professional duty of fidelity to put patients’ interests
above all others, even their own. Divided roles,
interests, or activities that compromise loyalty or
judgement and create a conflict of interest between
patients and MPs are specifically disallowed.9 For
a social function as important as the PPR, this
“fiduciary expectation” is justifiable and consistent
with the Hippocratic tradition: “The actions of
medical practitioners are supposed to promote the
interests of patients above all others, including the
physician.”10 Philosopher Hans Jones summarises
this duty: “In the course of treatment, the physician is
obligated to the patient and to no one else. He is not
the agent of society, nor of the interest of medical
science, the patient’s family, the patient’s co-sufferers,
or future sufferers from the same disease. The patient
alone counts when he is under the physician’s
care…[H]e is bound not to let any other interest
interfere with that of the patient in being cured….
We may speak of a sacred trust; strictly by its
terms, the doctor is, as it were, alone with his patient
and God.”11
Fidelity is also a legal duty: “The law expects
fiduciaries to be loyal to [beneficiaries], to be scrupu-
lously honest with them, and to act solely for their
benefit.” (Johnson v Buttress, 1936). One court sums
up the duty by saying: “The law of fiduciary duty
rests…on the acceptance of the implications of the
biblical injunction that ‘[n]o man can serve two
masters.’ (Matt. 6:24). Duty and self-interest, like God
and Mammon, make inconsistent calls on the faithful.
Equity solves the problem in a practical way by
insisting that fiduciaries give undivided loyalty to the
persons whom they serve.” (Gaudron and McHugh JJ
in Breen v Williams, 1995-1996). In this view, it is
both unethical and illegal for the fiduciary to be in a
position where interest and duty may conflict.
In many common law countries, fiduciary laws
have been passed to deal with the abuse of loyalty by
MPs. These laws impose a higher standard than
traditional tort or contract principles12 and may appear
either as prescriptions or proscriptions or both.
Proscriptive fiduciary laws exact loyalty from MPs
by either (1) preventing MPs from exerting ‘undue
influence’ over their patients, eg coercion, or (2) pre-
venting the patient’s trust from abuse, eg breaching
confidence or abandoning patients. Prescriptive
laws impose affirmative obligations on MPs to act
in their patients’ best interests and with good faith
and loyalty. For example, the Canadian Supreme
Court has held that professional conduct must
take a form such that patients may perceive that
“the duty of the doctor to act with utmost good
faith and loyalty has been fulfilled,” (La Forest
J, McInerney v MacDonald, 1992) which may
include affirmative duties such as allowing patients
full access to their medical records, attending to
sick people before their formal acceptance as patients
in an emergency, or treating contagious high-risk
patients in an epidemic even at the risk of harming
themselves or their families.
Conclusion
The monopoly, power, and ascendancy of the MP, and
the dependence, trust, and vulnerability of patients
justify our claim that the relational model that best
describes the PPR is the FR, which takes fidelity
as the fundamental norm for its regulation. This fidu-
ciary expectation of fidelity creates a legal and moral
affirmative duty for MPs to serve the patients’ best
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interests, even at the expense of their own, in both
emergency and non-emergency situations.
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